Arkansas Law Review

Is There a Search Warrant Jurisdictional Requirement? Arkansas Supreme Court Says No

Wagner v. State, 2010 Ark. 289 (2010)

          The Arkansas Supreme Court, in an issue of first impression, ruled that the jurisdiction of a “judicial officer” to issue a search warrant is not limited to the county in which he/she was elected. The issue arose with the adoption of Ark. Code Ann. § 16-17-929 and Amendment 80, § 7, which establish additional rules of jurisdiction.

          On October 21^st, the court dismissed the appeal in Wagner v. State from the Mississippi County Circuit Court by concluding that the statutory language did not bar the district court judge from issuing a warrant outside of his own district. In Wagner, the appellant contended that the District Judge for the Osceola District did not have jurisdiction to issue a search warrant for the Chickasawba District.  The appellant relied on the definition of “a judicial officer,” identified in Rule 1.6 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure, the unambiguous wording of § 16-17-929(c), and the power delegated to the General Assembly to establish jurisdiction under Amendment 80,  to determine that search warrants are limited to the judicial officer’s own district.

          The court agreed with the State that the meaning of “any judicial officer” was not affected by the enactment of § 16-17-929 and that the construction of the statute should be read in conformity to § 16-82-201(a), as defined in Brenk v. State, 311 Ark. 579, 847 S.W.2d 1 (1993). In Brenk, the court noted that § 16-82-201 did not “give any indication that the jurisdiction of a judicial officer in issuing search warrants is limited to the county in which the judicial officer was elected or appointed.” Id. at 590, 847 S.W.2d at 7.  In its holding in Wagner, the court stated that the adoption of both § 16-17-929 and Amendment 80 did not overturn the precedent in Brenk.  The newly adopted statutes were perceived as affecting the judge’s territorial jurisdiction to try a case, but not his/her authority to issue a search warrant.  Therefore, Brenk still applies and Arkansas district court judges are not limited to their own district when issuing search warrants.

Posted by Brandon Tittle

Ballot Title to Increase Usury Limitations: Fraud or Not?

Forrester v. Daniels, 2010 Ark. 362 (2010)

          In an opinion delivered on September 30th, the Arkansas Supreme Court granted the petitioner’s motion to expedite the proceedings in her suit against the Secretary of State of Arkansas in what may be an important case to Arkansas voters.  The proceedings involved a petition for injunctive relief and writ of mandamus to order the Arkansas Secretary of State to strike the certified ballot title for the proposed constitutional amendment No. 2 from the November 2, 2010 election.  The original complaint was filed on September 24th.

          House Joint Resolution (HJR) 1004, numbered and referred to as Issue No.2, will increase the maximum rate of interest for consumer loans to 17% and cancel the former monetary penalties set out in the constitution for usury violations.  The present usury limit on interest set forth in the Arkansas Constitution is 5% over the Federal Discount Rate, which together averages around 10%. 

          The petitioner’s main argument is that the ballot will constitute a manifest fraud on Arkansas voters (the ballot title is set forth below) for omitting crucial information from the title.  The petitioner also argues that the title for the proposed amendment No.2 does not adhere to the mandatory requirements of Ark. Code Ann. § 7-9-204, which requires that a proposed constitutional amendment must use the title of the Joint Resolution while the Joint Resolution was being considered by the Arkansas General Assembly.  The title of HJR 1004 (issue No.2) that was used while being considered and adopted by the member of the Arkansas House of Representatives was the following:

PROPOSING AN AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF ARKANSAS CONCERNING THE INTEREST RATE LIMITS

          The ballot title as seen above for Issue No. 2 was changed only 43 days before the General Election to read:

AN AMENDMENT CONCERNING INTEREST-RATE LIMITS AND THE ISSUANCE OF GOVERNMENT BONDS TO FINANCE ENERGY-EFFICIENTY PROJECTS

          Oral argument regarding the petitioner’s request for injunctive relief and writ of mandamus is set for October 21, 2010 in time for the November 2nd elections. The outcome of this case will be followed by the recent development blog of the Arkansas Law Review.

Posted by Brandon Tittle

Arkansas Law Review 2010 Symposium

          The Arkansas Law Review is pleased to announce the Arkansas Law Review 2010 Symposium on Judicial Elections.  It will take place at 2:30 p.m. Friday, November 12th in the Courtroom at the Leflar Law Center.  The symposium will feature a panel discussion between Arkansas Supreme Court Justice Robert Brown and Arkansas Circuit Court Judge Wendell Griffen. The discussion will be moderated by Professor Ron Rotunda, the Doy & Dee Henley Chair and Distinguished Professor of Jurisprudence, Chapman University School of Law.  The panel will be followed immediately by a reception in the Six Pioneers room.

          The symposium is free and open to the public. The symposium has also been approved for CLE, and attendees will receive two hours of general credit at no charge.  This is a great opportunity for CLE in Fayetteville the day before the Arkansas Razorbacks play UTEP at home.  

          The symposium will address the legal and political issues surrounding the propriety of judicial elections.  Areas of discussion will include whether Arkansas should elect its judges, whether judicial elections need reform, fundraising in judicial elections, and how the recent Supreme Court case Citizens United v. FEC will affect judicial elections.  It will represent a balanced presentation of the various viewpoints on these widely debated issues.  The panel will focus on judicial elections throughout the nation.  The speakers will address these topics and, following the symposium, the Arkansas Law Review will dedicate one issue of its publication to scholarly works focusing on this topic.

          For more information on the symposium, please visit arkansaslawreview.org or contact Haley Heath at hheath@uark.edu. 

DNA Samples are Not Testimonial Evidence for 5th Amendment Purposes

Talley v. State, 2010 Ark. 357, __S.W.3d__ (2010)

          On September 30^th, 2010, the Arkansas Supreme Court failed to extend the protections provided by the Fifth Amendment right against self incrimination to an officer’s repeated request for DNA testing.  In its holding in Talley v. State, the court determined that DNA testing was equivalent to blood sampling, a process which prior case law concluded was void of the constitutional safeguard. 

          In Talley, the police asked the defendant in an interrogation room to submit to a DNA test after the right to remain silent had been invoked by the defendant.  The defendant, after three repeated attempts by the police to obtain the testing, finally succumbed to their request.  He stated, “Y’all are going to get it anyway, right?”  The DNA was a direct match to the crime in question.  The defendant then moved to suppress the evidence in violation of his Fifth Amendment right to avoid self incrimination. 

          The court held that the protections provided by the Fifth Amendment against self incrimination only applied to incriminating communicative statements and that a request for DNA elicits only a “yes or no” response, rather than a communicative response.  The decision was closely derived from previous cases involving the right to counsel when blood samples were requested.  In all of these closely related cases, the evidence that was obtained was considered to be physical rather than testimonial in nature.  The distinction between DNA testing and blood sampling was deemed insignificant by the Talley court.  The court’s conclusion was that the prohibition against commencing further communication after a defendant has invoked his Miranda rights does not protect a defendant from requests for DNA samples.

Posted by Brandon Tittle

DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT

Sharon Foster, Associate Professor of Law at the University of Arkansas

By Professor Sharon Foster

          On July 21, 2010, the President signed into law the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (H.R. 4173).  This legislation, in response to the financial crisis of 2008, is intended to do many things; however, what it does not do is eliminate the systemic financial service institutions that were the core cause of the financial crisis.  Generally speaking, a systemic financial service institution is a combination commercial bank and investment bank that is deemed to create domestic and possibly international economic instability in the event of its failure (too-big-to-fail.)  Prior to the financial crisis of 2008, financial institutions with a combination of assets, leverage and interconnectedness in excess of 18.97% of combined United States gross domestic product (“GDP”) and United States banking assets were deemed too big to fail.  This was the case with Continental Illinois in 1984.  During the financial crisis of 2008, some of the financial service institutions deemed too big to fail exceeded one hundred percent of the combined GDP and United States banking assets.

          According to a preliminary staff report recently submitted to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FICI),  entitled Governmental Rescues of “Too-Big-to-Fail” Financial Institutions (dated August 31, 2010) the Federal Deposit Corporation Insurance Improvement Act of 1991 (“FDICIA”) originally enacted to limit the scope and effect of previous too-big-to-fail bail-outs, in particular barring the FDIC from approving a transaction that protected uninsured depositors or other uninsured creditors, included a “systemic risk” exception.  This “systemic risk” exception allows the FDIC to protect uninsured depositors and creditors of a failing bank in order to avoid “serious adverse effects on economic conditions or financial stability.” (See 12 USC 1823(c)(4)(G)(i).)  While prior to the financial crisis of 2008 experts debated whether this codification of too-big-to-fail would reduce or increase bail-outs, the FICI staff report makes it clear that after its enactment, financial service institutions that were believed by the market to be too-big-to-fail enjoyed enhanced competitive advantages.  Specifically, bond investors reacted less to a negative credit ratings change for a financial service institution believed to be too-big-to-fail.  Additionally, financial service institutions believed to be too-big-to-fail were given a ratings bonus in terms of ratings upgrades by the rating agencies.  This ratings bonus amounted to a substantial subsidy to these institutions in terms of reduced funding costs because of lower rates paid on bonds and other rating sensitive products.  Further, some experts argued that too-big-to-fail financial service institutions have a competitive advantage because they were allowed to operate with lower equity rations and could pay lower interest rates on their domestic deposit accounts.  Finally, the report references a study that indicates that in a merger context, acquiring banks were willing to pay a significant bonus to target bank shareholders when the acquisition would result in a too-big-to-fail financial service institution.

          So what does the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act do to address the problem of too-big to-fail?  It manages systemic financial service institutions through possible enhanced capital requirements and reduced leverage rations, although the legislation leaves the requirements open to regulations.  For example, Section 165 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act allows the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve to establish “risk-based capital requirements and leverage limits.”  Further, there is a three to five year transition period for most of the enhanced supervision under this section.

          Theoretically, enhanced capital and reduced leverage should go a long way to reduce the possibility of the failure of a systemic financial service institution or, at least, reduce the cost if one does fail.  But we have learned from the not too distant past that much of this will depend upon the ultimate regulations promulgated, real and effective regulatory oversight, and the elimination of the all too frequent hubris that we have mastered the market and no longer need to be diligent with regulatory oversight.  Interestingly, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act seems to anticipate future hubris.

          The two main banking law provisions relied upon by the government to bail-out systemic financial service institutions, 12 USC 1823(c)(4)(G)(i) and 12 USC 343, remain the law with little to no revision.  The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act leaves intact the systemic risk exception in 12 USC 1823(c)(4)(G)(i).  As for 12 USC 343, this is the provision relied on by the Federal Reserve to provide liquidity for failing systemic financial service institutions during the 2008 financial crisis.  Prior to the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act the pertinent language read:

          In unusual and exigent circumstances, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, by the affirmative vote of not less than five members, may authorize any Federal reserve bank, during such periods as the said board may determine, at rates established in accordance with the provisions of section 357 of this title, to discount for any individual, partnership, or corporation, notes, drafts, and bills of exchange when such notes, drafts, and bills of exchange are indorsed or otherwise secured to the satisfaction of the Federal reserve bank: Provided, That before discounting any such note, draft, or bill of exchange for an individual or a partnership or corporation the Federal reserve bank shall obtain evidence that such individual, partnership, or corporation is unable to secure adequate credit accommodations from other banking institutions. All such discounts for individuals, partnerships, or corporations shall be subject to such limitations, restrictions, and regulations as the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System may prescribe.

          As amended by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 USC 343 reads as follows:

(3)(a) In unusual and exigent circumstances, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, by the affirmative vote of not less than five members, may authorize any Federal reserve bank, during such periods as the said board may determine, at rates established in accordance with the provisions of section 357 of this title, to discount for any participant in any program or facility with broad-based eligibility, notes, drafts, and bills of exchange when such notes, drafts, and bills of exchange are indorsed or otherwise secured to the satisfaction of the Federal reserve bank: Provided, That before discounting any such note, draft, or bill of exchange the Federal reserve bank shall obtain evidence that such participant in any program or facility with broad-based eligibility is unable to secure adequate credit accommodations from other banking institutions. All such discounts for any participant in any program or facility with broad-based eligibility shall be subject to such limitations, restrictions, and regulations as the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System may prescribe.

(B)(i) As soon as is practicable after the date of enactment of this subparagraph, the Board shall establish, by regulation, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the policies and procedures governing emergency lending under this paragraph. Such policies and procedures shall be designed to ensure that any emergency lending program or facility is for the purpose of providing liquidity to the financial system, and not to aid a failing financial company, and that the security for emergency loans is sufficient to protect taxpayers from losses and that any such program is terminated in a timely and orderly fashion. The policies and procedures established by the Board shall require that a Federal reserve bank assign, consistent with sound risk management practices and to ensure protection for the taxpayer, a lendable value to all collateral for a loan executed by a Federal reserve bank under this paragraph in determining whether the loan is secured satisfactorily for purposes of this paragraph.

(ii) The Board shall establish procedures to prohibit borrowing from programs and facilities by borrowers that are insolvent. Such procedures may include a certification from the chief executive officer (or other authorized officer) of the borrower, at the time the borrower initially borrows under the program or facility (with a duty by the borrower to update the certification if the information in the certification materially changes), that the borrower is not insolvent. A borrower shall be considered insolvent for purposes of this subparagraph, if the borrower is in bankruptcy, resolution under title II of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, or any other Federal or State insolvency proceeding.

(iii) A program or facility that is structured to remove assets from the balance sheet of a single and specific company, or that is established for the purpose of assisting a single and specific company avoid bankruptcy, resolution under title II of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, or any other Federal or State insolvency proceeding, shall not be considered a program or facility with broad-based eligibility.

(iv) The Board may not establish any program or facility under this paragraph without the prior approval of the Secretary of the Treasury.

(C) The Board shall provide to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives–

(i) not later than 7 days after the Board authorizes any loan or other financial assistance under this paragraph, a report that includes–

(I) the justification for the exercise of authority to provide such assistance;

(II) the identity of the recipients of such assistance;

(III) the date and amount of the assistance, and form in which the assistance was provided; and

(IV) the material terms of the assistance, including–

(aa) duration;

(bb) collateral pledged and the value thereof;

(cc) all interest, fees, and other revenue or items of value to be received in exchange for the assistance;

(dd) any requirements imposed on the recipient with respect to employee compensation, distribution of dividends, or any other corporate decision in exchange for the assistance; and

(ee) the expected costs to the taxpayers of such assistance; and

(ii) once every 30 days, with respect to any outstanding loan or other financial assistance under this paragraph, written updates on–

(I) the value of collateral;

(II) the amount of interest, fees, and other revenue or items of value received in exchange for the assistance; and

(III) the expected or final cost to the taxpayers of such assistance.

(D) The information required to be submitted to Congress under subparagraph (C) related to–

(i) the identity of the participants in an emergency lending program or facility commenced under this paragraph;

(ii) the amounts borrowed by each participant in any such program or facility;

(iii) identifying details concerning the assets or collateral held by, under, or in connection with such a program or facility, shall be kept confidential, upon the written request of the Chairman of the Board, in which case such information shall be made available only to the Chairpersons or Ranking Members of the Committees described in subparagraph (C).

(E) If an entity to which a Federal reserve bank has provided a loan under this paragraph becomes a covered financial company, as defined in section 201 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, at any time while such loan is outstanding, and the Federal reserve bank incurs a realized net loss on the loan, then the Federal reserve bank shall have a claim equal to the amount of the net realized loss against the covered entity, with the same priority as an obligation to the Secretary of the Treasury under section 210(b) of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.

          These new provisions to 12 USC 343 in essence codify practices implemented during the financial crisis of 2008.  They may enhance transparency, they may ensure prudent practices, but they leave open the distinct possibility of future bail-outs.

8th Circuit Revised Local Rules Adopt a Mandatory Electronic Filing Requirement, Effective October 1st

Revised Eighth Circuit Rules

          Effective October 1, 2010, the local rules for the Eighth Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals will be revised to require that all attorneys file electronically over the CM/ECF system.  The new rules are very important to those wishing to appeal in the Eighth Circuit because paper documents will no longer be allowed.

          According to Rule 47 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure (FRAP), the Eighth Circuit is allowed to adopt its own local rules to supplement the FRAP.  The main revisions will expand on specific local rules, implementing a new electronic filing requirement.  The specific local rules that will undergo the change include filing and service under Eighth Circuit rule 25A-B and briefs under Eighth Circuit rule 28A. Below is a summary of the changes in the stated local rules that will take effect on October 1^st:

Eighth Circuit Rule 25A

          The main change is that the use of the CM/ECF is mandatory for all attorneys.  The rule, however, provides an exception for pro se litigants, who will be allowed to submit paper copies.  Attorneys will be required to register to obtain a password and login to use the filing system.  Exemptions may be granted for good cause, which the clerk determines, and a form must be completed in order to apply for one.  Furthermore, the filing constitutes the official record in the appeal.  The CM/ECF will generate a Notice of Document Activity when any document is filed, which will constitute service of the document, and the attorney’s registration on the electronic system is deemed consent of the service. The clerk’s office will use the CM/ECF system to provide notice to all registered participants in a case.

Eighth Circuit Rule 25B

          Rule 25B governs the filing by a pro se litigant who doesn’t register on the electronic system.  The clerk will basically serve as an intermediary between the registered CM/ECF user, exempt attorney and the pro se litigant.  The clerk will provide the pro se litigant with a listing which will show whether a party can be served electronically by the clerk or must be served by mail by the pro se litigant.

Eighth Circuit Rule 28A

          This section deals with briefs filed by registered CM/ECF users and pro se litigants.  Registered users of the CM/ECF electronic system who are not exempt must submit their briefs by filing using the CM/ECF system.  Attorneys exempt from CM/ECF must submit their briefs through email.  Pro se litigants must submit one (1) paper copy of their brief to the clerk who will review the brief for compliance and then scan it into the CM/ECF system.  Registered CM/ECF users and the exempt attorneys must transmit ten (10) paper copies of the brief to the clerk within five (5) days of receipt of notice that the brief was reviewed and electronically filed.  Finally, an electronic version of the addendum is required for every appellant’s brief that is submitted electronically.

Posted by Brandon Tittle

The Effect on the Arkansas Homestead Exemption by Property Held in a Revocable Trust

Fitton v. Bank of Little Rock, 2010 Ark. 280, _S.W.3d_ (2010)

          In June, the Arkansas Supreme court issued an important decision for those who seek to create or who already maintain a revocable trust.

          In a case of first impression, the Arkansas Supreme Court decided that the Arkansas homestead exemption—which protects debtors from losing their primary place of residence to creditors—extends to property held by spouses in a revocable trust.  The case of Fitton v. Bank of Little Rock is a great addition to Arkansas’s property law with respect to the popular and widely known homestead exemption.  

          In Fitton v. Bank of Little Rock, decided on June 3, 2010, the Arkansas Supreme Court was faced with the interesting question of whether property owned in a revocable trust by spouses as tenants in common with a right of survivorship was subject to the homestead exemption.  In this case, two individuals prior to marriage created a separate revocable trust and executed a quitclaim deed whereby the future spouses deeded their one-half interest in the residence to their respective trust as tenants in common. 

          After marriage, but before divorce, the husband individually signed a promissory note to institute a mortgage with the Bank of Little Rock for his undivided one-half interest.  The wife was left in the dark about the mortgage at the conclusion of the divorce and was conveyed the husband’s one-half interest in the real estate in the property settlement.  The wife did not pay the outstanding mortgage and the Bank of Little Rock sued to foreclose on the property. The wife, in answering the complaint, argued that she did not lose her homestead exemption by conveying the property to a revocable trust in which she was the settler, trustee, beneficiary, and occupant of the real estate.  The trial court granted partial summary judgment because, in their view, the homestead exemption did not apply to a revocable trust.

          The Arkansas Supreme Court, in reversing and remanding the trial court’s decision, held that a married person with a beneficiary interest in a property who maintains a principal residence is entitled to a homestead exemption, although the title of the property is held by a revocable trust.    The court used the same definition of the homestead exemption used in the context of property tax assessments on property conveyances.  The definition included “a dwelling owned by a revocable trust and used as the principal place of residence of a person who formed the trust.”  The court then applied the same rationale from the recent case of Richardson v. Klaesson, 210 F.3d 811 (8th Cir. 2001), which provided persuasive support for the court’s holding that “a person in possession as the beneficiary of a trust [can] claim the protection of the homestead exemption.”  Therefore, the homestead exemption was deemed to apply to revocable trusts, although maintaining the property as the individual’s principal residence was perceived as an important factor.

Posted by Brandon Tittle

Interpretation of the Newly Amended District Court Rule 9 for Perfecting an Appeal

Johnson v. Dawson, 2010 Ark. 308, _S.W.3d_ (2010)

          In recent case Johnson v. Dawson, the Arkansas Supreme Court made clear that Arkansas attorneys wishing to perfect an appeal to the state’s circuit court must strictly adhere to Arkansas District Court Rule 9.  Strict compliance requires the filing of a docket sheet–and not its equivalent–in order to perfect an appeal.  Attorneys seeking to perfect an appeal without filing a docket sheet will find no sympathy from the court.   

          In Johnson v. Dawson, decided on June 24, 2010, the Arkansas Supreme Court analyzed the requirements of Arkansas District Court Rule 9 for perfecting an appeal, which was recently amended on January 1, 2009.  The original appellant in Johnson filed an “appeal transcript” in order to appeal two default judgments from a small claims court to the circuit court.  The appellee moved for a motion to dismiss the appeal for failure to comply with District Court Rule 9, which requires the party seeking an appeal to a circuit court to file a certified copy of the docket sheet.  The appellant argued that even the district court clerk was unaware of the existence of a “docket sheet” and that despite his own negligence, the “appeal transcript” was sufficient for perfecting an appeal because there was nothing on the ‘docket sheet’ that was not included in the appeal transcript he had filed.   The circuit court held that the appeal transcript was equivalent to the docket sheet and found that the appellant complied with Rule 9.  The appellee then became the appellant, appealing the circuit court’s decision.

          The Arkansas Supreme Court held that the appeal transcript was not the proper equivalent of the docket sheet, taking a strict stance on the newly amended statutory provision, noting that “substantial compliance will not suffice.” 

          The court reasoned that the statute does not allow a party to take an appeal by filing a certified copy of the docket sheet or its equivalent.  The court held that only the docket sheet will suffice to make an appeal even if the required information is ultimately provided in another form.  It then stated in a somewhat non-sympathetic tone that it is the “duty of counsel, not the judge, clerk or reporter, to perfect the appeal” and that incompliance with the clear language of Rule 9 may not be excused.

Posted by Brandon Tittle

University of Arkansas School of Law Moves Up!

Today U.S. News and World Report released their annual law school rankings, listing the University of Arkansas at number 86 in its top tier.  Last year the school of law was ranked 94, and over last four years the school has moved up 22 spots!

Rule 5-2: How We’re Citing New Arkansas Cases

In light of Arkansas Supreme Court and Court of Appeals Rule 5-2 and the transition to electronic publication of opinions, the Arkansas Law Review has adjusted its policies for recent Arkansas decisions.  The law review policy adheres to the examples provided by the Arkansas Supreme Court in its per curiam opinion on Rule 5-2, but also includes guidelines for short-form citations.  Here is the relevant portion of the law review policies including the amendment:

A. Cases.  The Arkansas Law Review provides parallel citations for all Arkansas cases.  Parallel citations should only be provided for Arkansas cases.  See Bluepage B5.1.3.

1. Arkansas Cases Published Before February 14, 2009. These decisions should be cited to the reporter in which they appear, with a parallel citation to the regional reporter and a date parenthetical.

2. Arkansas Cases Published on February 14, 2009 or Later. These decisions are available on the Arkansas Judiciary website and should be cited by referring to the case name, the year of the decision, the abbreviated court name, and the appellate decision number.  Do not include a date parenthetical.  Parallel citations to the regional reporter, if available, are required.  If the opinion is not, and will not, be reported in the regional reporter, then a parallel citation to the Westlaw citation number must be provided.  If the opinion will be published in the regional reporter but has not been assigned page numbers, include the parallel citation with two underscores in place of each forthcoming reporter number.  Examples: